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The definition of 'disaster' is the subject of continued debate, with one side considering a small leak of water dripping onto a priceless painting a disaster, while others would consider it just an 'incident'.

There is no reason why the risk assessment used for counter disaster planning should not embrace these types of incident, it just means that the response does not need be so involved.
Disaster Planning assumes that a disaster is unavoidable, which is a sensible assumption as it gives urgency to putting a workable plan in place 'just in case'. This plan should detail the contingencies to cope with most situations. However the fact that a disaster has occurred should be regarded as a failure of preventative measures.

Counter Disaster Planning
Prevention is obviously better than cure and in terms of disaster is commonly known as Counter Disaster Planning. A counter disaster plan varies in its scope and detail according to the size and complexity of the premises. In large premises, museums, art galleries and houses containing collections it should be a comprehensive manual covering everything including

• routine preventative housekeeping action,
• fire safety measures
• risk assessments,
• emergency procedures,
• contact and facilities lists
• Prioritised salvage plan
• Managing a salvage squad.
• Business continuity planning

Compiling the Plan
Site staff and management will be the best people to compile a manual, as they will already have an idea of the hazards and threats to the building and the value of its contents. They will know that the hidden valley on the roof will leak after a snowstorm, or leaves will block the gullies in the autumn. They will also know where the concentrations of combustibles are kept and when too much stationery is delivered and where it is stored temporarily.

The advantage of producing an in-house plan is that it can easily be updated. In fact it should be continuously reviewed, perhaps quarterly or when new collections arrive, so that it is never 'signed ' off and filed.

The plan should be easy to understand and should be accessible to any authorised person who needs to use it. The sections devoted to emergency actions such as contact lists, salvage priorities etc may need to be read in adverse conditions, so should be in large print and preferably encapsulated so that they are not unreadable when they get wet.
Diagrams, plans and pictures are a concise way to convey messages.

Threats to Consider
Fire and flood are probably the two biggest threats, but security should not be forgotten, both as a preventative measure and during salvage operations.

Security
The probability of arson attacks can be reduced with good security measures, but the difficulties of removing secure objects and the movement and storage of valuables during salvage operations need consideration.

The security of the salvage priority list and the information it contains should also be considered because it also needs to be accessible in emergencies.

Fire Risks
Museums and art galleries do not seem to be high fire risk premises, with a very low fire loading, few ignition sources, high ceilings and large open spaces with a high level of supervision. Many of these public buildings are Georgian or Victorian and have grand public spaces, but often hidden away in the basements and upper floors are smaller rooms used for a variety of purposes, including offices, workshops, archives, kitchens boiler rooms and storage areas.

It is in these areas that the real dangers lie;

• The highest concentrations of combustibles are kept here.
• More ignition sources are found in these areas than the public rooms.
• The ceilings are lower which will hasten the spread of fire.
• Housekeeping is often less vigorous in these areas because they are out of the public eye.
• Valuable collections are often stored here when not on public view.
• These areas are more likely to have had holes made in fire resisting walls, for the passage of services.
• Roof spaces are often used for the storage of combustibles and together with the roof timbers provide fuel for a serious fire, which would be almost impossible to tackle successfully.

Fire fighting water is prevented from being applied from the outside because the roof is designed to keep water out and internal access is usually restricted. Even if access is made, the conditions inside the roof space could be extremely hazardous because of the lack of ventilation. Many of the large fires witnessed in historic buildings have only involved the lower floors after the roofs have collapsed.

• Hidden voids can lead to unseen fire spread to areas remote from the origin of the fire and a fire in these spaces is extremely difficult to fight.

• The upper floors are more difficult to access to fight fires and hose may need to be laid up stairs and along corridors. This will lead to delays before a fire can be tackled.

• The basement is often very difficult for fire fighters to access because they may need to fight their way through the heat layer to tackle a fire and subsequent ventilation is not always easy.

Will the Building Survive a Fire?
One way of determining the likely affect of fire on a building and its contents is to use the 'Building Fire Performance Evaluation Methodology', otherwise known as the 'Method', which is taught at the Fire Services College. This involves looking for the room that seems to be the highest fire risk.

Fire in the room of origin
It is then assumed that a fire occurs which has enough energy to spread and involve the whole room (flashover). Whether this occurs or whether it just burns out will depend on the amount of combustibles, how close they are to each other, the available ventilation, the volume of the room and the ceiling height.

These factors and the flammability of the contents of the room will also give an indication of how quickly it will reach full room involvement.

Subsequent fire spread
A judgement is then made as to the probability that the fire will spread to an adjacent space and then the probability that it will involve the whole floor and then the whole building. This can be judged by looking at the fire resistance of the partitions ceilings and doors. The time taken for fire to spread from the room of origin will also depend on the fire rating of these various elements of structure.

Time taken until the fire is fought
The time taken before an intervention, such as first aid fire fighting, or tackling by the fire brigade is then assessed by looking at the following factors;

• How quickly will the fire be detected

• Is automatic detection provided and is it heat or smoke activated?

• How long will it take before first aid fire fighting commences?

• Is there a 24-hour presence so that first aid fire fighting can be instigated?

• If there is not a 24-hour presence is the fire alarm monitored so the fire brigade can be called automatically.

• How long will it take for the fire brigade to attend? This will vary according to the time of day, whether they are full time or retained, the distance from the fire station, the traffic conditions and the ease of access.

• When the fire brigade arrive, the time taken before water can be applied to the fire. This will depend on how close the fire engines can get to the building, the available water supplies, the distance that hoses will need to be laid between the water supplies and the fire engine and between the fire engine and the fire.

If the total time taken from a fire starting to the point that fire fighting begins is longer than the time taken for the fire to spread beyond the room of origin, then some remedial action needs to be taken.

Other Fire Hazards
Whenever there are contractors on site, for whatever reason, from catering for an event to displaying a new collection or where building works are taking place there will be additional hazards. A new risk assessment should be undertaken to address each situation.

Catering
Where caterers are used for events the contract should be clear about what operations can and cannot be carried out, what areas can be used and who has the authority (preferably site staff) to make sure that the conditions of contract are being adhered to.
Menus should be agreed to in advance so that additional hazards such as deep fat frying or the use of blowtorches can be anticipated. Additional safeguards can then be put into place, or if necessary the menu can be changed to eliminate the hazard.
By making these conditions clear in advance, problems arising in the middle of an event can be avoided.

Building Works
The additional threats which building works pose can include;

• Loss of fire separation caused by the removal of doors or repair of partitions or ceilings.

• Temporary isolation of fire detectors to avoid false alarms caused by dust.

• Additional fire loading caused by the temporary storage of building materials and packaging.

• Additional sources of ignition caused by temporary lighting, plumbing works, sparks from cutting gear, burning paint and lead burning. These ignition sources should be controlled by a system of Hot Work Permits, or better still banning hot work altogether.

• Poor water supplies because hydrants have been covered or have not yet been fitted.

• Poor fire brigade access because of temporary hoarding or site huts.

Remedial action and listed buildings
There will probably be a whole range of possible actions to take to improve the building fire performance. Not all of them may be possible because of listed building constraints, cost or desirability. The following questions may help decide on which course of action to take.

• What factors have been identified as the biggest threats to the building and contents?

• Can these threats be reduced to an acceptable level that does not involve any upgrading, such as reducing the fire load, or changing the use of the building or parts of the building.

• If improvements are necessary, are they reversible, sympathetic to the appearance of the
building and avoid damage to the historic fabric?

• Will the improvements be effective? For instance, the provision of a fire alarm and detection system, which is not monitored, will not provide any protection when the building is unoccupied.

• The provision of an automatic detection system may cut down the time before a fire is discovered, but is it reduced sufficiently so that it is unlikely that fire will spread to adjoining spaces. If not, another layer of improvements, such as a sprinkler system or local water mist system may be necessary.

• Will the improvements be affordable and if not is there a more cost-effective alternative?

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